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Rosenblum v. Adler: Auditors' Liability for
Negligent Misrepresentation-"The
Explosive Power Resident in Words"
I. INTRODUCTION
H. Rosenblum, Inc. and its subsidiary, Summit Productions,
operated retail catalogue showrooms in New Jersey in the early
1970's.1 In November of 1971, the companies' principal owners, the
Rosenblums, began merger negotiations with Giant, a Massachu-
setts corporation. Giant operated discount department stores, re-
tail catalogue showrooms, and gift shops. Its stock was publicly
traded on the American Stock Exchange.2 Giant's auditors were
Touche, Ross and Company (Touche), a prominent national ac-
counting firm. Touche prepared audit reports concerning Giant's
financial statements starting in 1969, when Giant initially filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, until 1972. Giant
included these audit opinions in its annual 10-K report3 and in its
annual report to its stockholders.
On December 14, 1971, Giant offered 360,000 shares of is com-
mon stock to the public.4 The merger negotiations continued
throughout this period. The offering prospectus 5 included income
statements for each of the four fiscal years from January 31, 1967
through January 30, 1971. The prospectus also included the corpo-
ration's balance sheets for the same period, as well as Touche's
1. Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 330, 461 A.2d 138, 140-41 (1983).
2. Id.
3. Many companies must file, within 90 or 120 days of the end of each fiscal year, an
annual report, Form 10-K, that contains certified financial statements. The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 requires that companies include independent certified financial state-
ments in these annual reports; almost all companies that have assets of at least
$1,000,000.00 and 500 holders of a class of equity securities must file the reports. Id. at 345
n.9, 461 A.2d at 149 n.9 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(1)(g)(1) (West Supp. 1981)).
4. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 330, 461 A.2d at 141.
5. A prospectus is "[a] document published by a... corporation. . . setting forth the
nature and objects of an issue of shares, debentures, or other securities created by the com-
pany or corporation, and inviting the public to subscribe to the issue." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1100 (5th ed. 1979). Under federal securities law the term "'prospectus' means any
prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter or communication, written or by radio or
television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security ... " Se-
curities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1982). The Securities Act of 1933 requires that the
prospectus filed with respect to public offerings of securities include certified financial state-
ments. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77g, 77aa (West Supp. 1981).
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opinion report on the financial statements as a whole.' The opinion
stated that "the financial statements 'present[ed] fairly' Giant's fi-
nancial position."
7
Frankel, a partner in Touche, attended a number of the
merger negotiations but did not directly participate in the discus-
sion.' Nevertheless, the Rosenblums alleged that Frankel attended
the meeting at which they received the 1971 audited statements,
and that Frankel "stated during one meeting that the preliminary
figures of the 1972 audit . . . indicated that it was going to be a
'very strong year for Giant Stores, it is probably going to be the
best in history . . ., ."' The negotiations resulted in a merger
agreement executed on March 9, 1972. The agreement required the
Rosenblums to sell their operations to Giant in exchange for Giant
common stock.10 "Giant [also] agreed that as of the closing it
would represent and warrant that there had 'been no material ad-
verse change in the business, properties or assets of Giant and its
6. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 330, 461 A.2d at 141.
7. Id. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [hereinafter cited as
AICPA] identifies four types of standard opinions that an auditor may use in reporting on
financial statements: the unqualified, the qualified, the adverse, or the disclaimer of opinion.
The latter is used when an "auditor has not performed an examination sufficient in scope to
enable him to form an opinion on the financial statements" and when the report states that
no opinion is expressed on the statements. "An adverse opinion states that financial state-
ments do not present fairly [the company's financial position]. ... and is used when the
auditor determines that the statements taken as a whole are not fairly presented in con-
formity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). "A qualified opinion states
that 'except for' or 'subject to' the effects of a matter to which the qualification relates, the
financial statements present fairly the financial position. ... It is used when there is a
lack of sufficient competent evidential matter or when there is a scope restriction that pre-
cludes an unqualified opinion. An unqualified opinion, the type that Touche Ross expressed
on Giant, when used for comparative financial statements states:
We have examined the balance sheets of ABC Company as of December 31,
19X2 and 19Xl, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and
changes in financial position for the years then ended. Our examinations were
made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly,
included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures
as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the
financial position of ABC Coinpany as of December 31, 19X2 and 19X1, and the
results of its operations and the changes in its financial position for the years
then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied
on a consistent basis.
AICPA, Statements on Auditing Standards, 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AU §
505.03 (1983).
8. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 330-31, 461 A.2d at 141.




subsidiaries since July 31, 1971.' ',11 Thereafter, Giant released the
1972 audited statements. The Rosenblums relied on these state-
ments and closed the transaction on June 12, 1972.12
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended
trading in Giant common stock in April, 1973.13 Giant's manage-
ment had manipulated the company's books-they recorded ficti-
tious assets and omitted large amounts of accounts payable. 14 Be-
cause Touche failed to uncover these erroneous entries, the audited
financial statements were also incorrect. In May, Touche withdrew
its opinion on the results of the 1972 audit.1 5 Giant corporation
declined quickly thereafter; it filed for bankruptcy in September,
1973. The Rosenblums' stock became worthless.
The Rosenblums instituted the present action against Touche
in the New Jersey Superior Court, alleging fraudulent misrepresen-
tation, gross negligence, negligence, and breach of warranty in con-
nection with the 1971 and 1972 audits.1 6 The defendants moved for
partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the negligence
claim for the 1971 audit and of the negligence, gross negligence,
and fraud claims for the 1972 audit.17 The trial court granted the
motion as to the 1971 financial statements, but denied the motion
as to the 1972 statements. 18 The Appellate Division affirmed the
court's order concerning the 1971 audit but refused to grant defen-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The Rosenblum court noted that the SEC found that Touche's 1972 audit did
not meet professional standards and entered a consent order of censure against them. 93
N.J. at 331 n.1, 461 A.2d at 141 n.1 (citing In re Touche Ross & Co., Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 15978, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) D 72, 175 A (1979)).
14. Other repercussions of the management fraud included criminal indictment and
conviction of several of the company's officers. Gormley, The Foreseen, The Foreseeable,
and Beyond-Accountants' Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 553 (1984). The
SEC is concentrating its enforcement resources into a massive crackdown on a growing area
of financial fraud-"cooking the books." These investigations focus primarily on companies
that falsify their books and records in order to distort their true financial condition. As part
of this effort, the SEC is also targeting companies and their outside auditors who misapply
generally accepted accounting principles in what has come to be known as "cute account-
ing." Middleton, Hot Item at the SEC: 'Cooking the Books,' THE NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1984,
at 1. Although the crackdown has sparked criticism from "[s]ecurities lawyers who contend
that it amounts to second-guessing by the agency of the good-faith judgments of manage-
ment, their accountants and lawyers," SEC officials say that the trend toward increased
enforcement in the area is likely to continue. Id. at 24.
15. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 331, 461 A.2d at 141. The AICPA, in AU § 561.08, mandates
withdrawal of the auditors' report.
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dant's motion for leave to appeal the ruling on the 1972 audit.19
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted both parties' motions
for leave to appeal and combined the cases for argument.20
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the trial court's
denial of the defendant's summary judgment motion on the 1972
audit and reversed and remanded the order granting the defen-
dant's motion on the 1971 audit. The court held that when an in-
dependent auditor furnishes an opinion to a company without
limit as to who may receive the statements, the auditor has a duty
to all reasonably foreseeable parties who receive the statements
from the audited company for a "proper business purpose" to exer-
cise reasonable care in the performance of the audit.21
II. PRIOR LAW
The common law liability of public accountants has remained
relatively unchanged over the last half century. The judicial opin-
ions that reflect this dormancy cite the reasoning of Judge Cardozo
in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche22 and Glanzer v. Shepard28 for sup-
port. These cases held that accountants have no duty to refrain
from negligence toward third parties not in privity of contract with
the auditor, unless they are the primary beneficiaries of the
contract.
In Ultramares, plaintiff, a factor,2 ' loaned the Stern Company
large amounts of money based on financial statements certified by
Touche. The statements listed fictitious assets, which the auditors
failed to detect; the company subsequently went bankrupt. Chief
Judge Cardozo, speaking for a unanimous court, restricted the au-
ditor's liability to those whom the auditor knew would directly
benefit from the service. The court wanted to avoid exposing ac-
countants to unlimited liability25 at a time when the accounting
profession was a fledgling industry. Burdening the accounting in-
19. Rosenblum v. Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 444 A.2d 66 (1982).
20. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 332, 461 A.2d at 142.
21. Id. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
22. 255 N.Y. 170,.174 N.E. 441 (1931).
23. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
24. A factor is a commercial banker or finance company that specializes in providing
financial services to producers and dealers (e.g., the discounting of accounts receivable).
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 813 (1981).
25. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444 ("If liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.").
[Vol. 38:939
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dustry with such broad liability would mean hindering the capital
markets that rely on audited financial statements.2" Therefore,
Cardozo rejected the general negligence standard and limited an
accountant's liability to those in privity with him.1
7
The New York Court of Appeals had previously discarded the
traditional privity requirement for products liability actions in
Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co.28 Nevertheless, Cardozo distin-
guished Ultramares: "[Here] [w]e are . . . asked to say that a like
liability attaches to a circulation of a thought or a release of the
explosive power resident in words.' 29 Throughout the opinion, Car-
dozo emphasized that the main purpose of the accountant's audit
was to give management an indication of its position so that it
could evaluate its operations and make any necessary corrections.
Furthermore, he pointed out that "[p]ublic accountants are public
only in the sense that their services are offered to anyone who
chooses to employ them,"30 and that any liability for an "honest
blunder" should be bounded by the contract and enforced between
the contracting parties only.31 He stated that the average business-
man is one of a large group of possible investors who receive the
certificate free of charge and who, under the circumstances, expect
nothing more. 2 Several commentators have criticized this rationale
26. In support, Cardozo cited Moch Co. v. Renselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 164, 159
N.E. 896, 897 (1928). It should be noted that Moch also involved an important fledgling
industry, public water works, that could have been greatly hampered by such expansive
liability. See Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REV. 372, 392
(1939).
27. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441.
28. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
29. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 181, 174 N.E. at 445.
30. Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
31. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
32. This view of the role of the public accountant, perhaps accurate in 1931, is no
longer valid today. In the words of Justice Weiner, accountants have become "high priest
willing for a fee to translate, through the added mystique of computer software, the jargon
of almost incomprehensible financial transactions into neat, tabulated and word-processed
form .... " Weiner, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negli-
gent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 233, 235 (1983).
The AICPA, in reports on the objectives of financial accounting, addressed its attention
only to sophisticated users-i.e., creditors and investors with knowledge of economics, busi-
ness, and accounting. The proposals seem to "[accept] the principle that in the area of fi-
nancial statements and their understandability,. . . [accountants] have to assume that the
average layman cannot comprehend them and that, like the mysteries of ancient Egypt, you
need an elite priesthood to define and interpret what appears in the financial statements."
Stranger, Developments in the Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Re-
porting, and Their Impact Upon Legal Considerations, 33 Bus. LAw 2447, 2448 (1978).
With the myriad of financial information available today, even the sophisticated users must
rely on the accountant to put this data in usable form. The Director of the Office of Man-
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because they believe that the assumptions that underlie the deci-
sion are no longer valid. 33 Nevertheless, the courts take a different
view and continue to treat Ultramares as the leading authority on
auditors' liability.
3 4
Nine years before the Ultramares decision, the New York
Court of Appeals decided Glanzer v. Shepard.33 In Glanzer, a
buyer of beans brought suit against a public weigher. The weigher
contracted with the seller to certify weight sheets that the buyer
relied on to pay for the beans. When the buyer discovered discrep-
ancies between the certified weight and the actual amount re-
ceived, it brought suit against the weigher to recover the amount
overpaid for the purchase.
Judge Cardozo affirmed a directed verdict for the plaintiff and
held that where "[tihe plaintiffs' use of the certificates was not an
indirect, direct, or collateral consequence that, to the weigher's
knowledge, was the end aim of the transaction,' 3 the defendant
had a duty to use due diligence in the actual weighing and prepa-
ration of written certifications. Judge Cardozo said that duty ex-
tended not only to the person who ordered the service, but also to
those persons who relied upon it.
3 7
The appellant in Ultramares argued that the Glanzer ration-
agement and Budget confessed "'In]one of us really understands what's going on with all
these numbers .... '" Weiner, supra, at 235 (quoting Greider, The Education of David
Stockman, ATL., Dec. 1981, at 38). See also Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negli-
gent Audit, 1966 J. Bus. L. 190, 196 ("The legal duties of the auditor ought to be coextensive
with his professional pretensions. He aspires to more than being a rubber stamp for man-
agement, so his legal duties ought to go beyond that status. ... ); Solomon, Ultramares
Revisited, A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 56
(1968); Comment, Auditor's Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection
for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139, 178 (1968) ("Under present condi-
tions, the principal effect of the auditor's opinion to management is to meet the require-
ments of, and influence the actions of, third parties with whom the auditor has no
contract.").
33. They argue that the main purpose of financial statements has shifted to third party
users, and that with the expansion of the accounting industry and the availability of mal-
practice insurance for auditors, the concerns that troubled Cardozo in 1931 are no longer
applicable. See supra note 32 & infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text; Besser, Priv-
ity?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SETON
HALL L. REV. 507 (1976); Seavey, supra note 26, at 398-404. But see Gormley, supra note 14
(noting that the language of Ultramares, which recognized the various uses of financial
statements, but which nevertheless affirmed the necessity of restricted liability, contradicts
the argument that it is fairer to impose the cost of a negligent audit on the accountant in
light of the modern role of the accounting profession).
34. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
35. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
36. Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276.
[Vol. 38:939
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ale favored the imposition of liability upon the auditors. Judge
Cardozo distinguished the two cases, stating that the service in
Glanzer primarily benefited a third party, whereas the audit report
in Ultramares mainly benefited Stern Company.3 8 These distinc-
tions, however, are superficial. Although the Ultramares auditors
did not specifically prepare a report for the plaintiff, they did pro-
vide thirty-two copies of their report to Stern. Stern gave one of
these copies to the plaintiffs. Stern probably also used a number of
the other reports for similar purposes. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that Touche knew, or should have known, that some of the
copies would be used to induce banks, lenders, and investors to
loan the Stern Company money or to purchase its stock. Neverthe-
less, Judge Cardozo rejected this argument and limited the audi-
tor's liability to those parties in privity with the auditor or to those
parties that were primary beneficiaries of the underlying
contract.39
III. THE PRESENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Today, courts differ in their views on auditors' liability. A
number of jurisdictions continue to apply Judge Cardozo's "pri-
mary benefit" test."0 Another group of courts extend the auditor's
38. Cardozo distinguished Glanzer by stating that even though the Glanzer rule is
stated in terms of a legal duty, the court "could [have] reachled] the same result by stating
it in terms of contract." Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445. In Glanzer, a privity
relationship existed. The service performed primarily benefited a third party, whereas in
Ultramares the service performed primarily benefited the Stern Company: "a convenient
instrumentality for use in the development of the business." Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
Cardozo found that there was no contractual relationship establishing any duty on the part
of the defendants to the indeterminate class of persons dealing with the Stern Company. Id.
39. One commentator felt that "Cardozo weakened his opinion by making distinctions
where there are no differences" and that the true basis for the opinion was the "unknowable
extent of possible liability" as well as the difficulty in obtaining complete insurance protec-
tion were such a duty imposed upon the accountant. Seavey, supra note 26, at 400-01. For
the Rosenblum court's perception of the insurance argument, see infra notes 79-81 and ac-
companying text.
40. Of the twenty-four jurisdictions with reported decisions, eight apply Ultramares
strictly and allow negligence actions against parties in privity alone, leaving third parties to
pursue their remedy based on gross negligence or fraud. See Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Has-
kins and Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (although plaintiff-purchaser of client's major-
ity stock interest was known to the auditor, the court, construing Colorado law, believed
that Ultramares predominated and that only substantial evidence would suffice to show
that Colorado had aligned itself with the trend towards auditor liability to foreseen per-
sons); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) (in a minor pendent claim to a
federal securities law claim, the court, applying Delaware law in a diversity case, determined
that even if the plaintiff was known to the auditor, Ultramares prevails in Delaware); Koch
Indus. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1974) (the court determined that Kansas follows
19841
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liability to members of a limited group who the auditor intends to
supply audit information to or knows that the client will supply
audit information to."' The latter position is derived from the
American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 In the
Ultramares); Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 199
S.E.2d 564 (1973) (follows Ultramares), modified, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Pullen & Co., 161
Ga. App. 784, 289 S.E. 2d 792 (1982) (negligence action lies "where the third party is in a
limited class of persons known to be relying upon representations of accountants." Id. at
786, 289 S.E.2d at 795); Western Sur. Co. v. Loy, 3 Kan. App. 2d 310, 312, 594 P.2d 257, 260
(1979) ("the question of privity of contract is important in a suit against a certified public
accountant by a third person nonclient .... "); Dworman v. Lee, 83 A.D.2d 507, 507, 441
N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (1981) ("there can be no doubt that the rule in Ultramares remains authori-
tative, as it was in fact reaffirmed in White v. Guarante"), aff'd mem. 56 N.Y.2d 816, 438
N.E.2d 103, 452 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982); U.S. Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Fought, 46 Or. App. 635,
612 P.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1980) (the case involved an action for fraud and never reached the
negligence issue, but the trial court, citing Ultramares, found negligence could not be the
basis for recovery); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1909), distinguished in
Coleco Indus. Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (applying Pa. & N.J.
law-adopting Glanzer-Busch), modified, 567 F.2d 569 (1977).
41. See, Ingram Indus. Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (the federal
court found no state precedent but predicted that the Kentucky Supreme Court would
adopt the Restatement (Second) position. It also determined that gross negligence is
equivalent to fraud but that a claim predicated on both gross negligence and fraud indepen-
dently is allowed); Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979) (interpreting
Nebraska and Indiana law. The court found no cases in either state but opined that each
would adopt a Restatement-like standard. Nevertheless, the court's holding merely denied a
motion to dismiss a claim based on reckless and wanton conduct (gross negligence)); Merit
Ins. Co. v. Colao, 603 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying Illinois law); Hochfelder v. Ernst &
Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974); Brumley v. Touche, Ross & Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 636,
463 N.E.2d 195, 200 (1984) (the court adopted the test from an attorney malpractice case
and held that an accountant owes a duty to a third party if the accountant "was acting at
the direction of or on behalf of his client to benefit or influence a third-party"). In order to
recover, the court noted, the plaintiff should allege that the auditor knew of the plaintiff
and the purpose of the report and that the auditor completed their report with that purpose
in mind. Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976); Hadden View Investment Co. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982).
42. The full text of the Restatement appears as follows:
§ 552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others.
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicat-
ing the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered;
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient in-
tends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
[Vol. 38:939
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jurisdictions that do not follow Ultramares, however, only one
court has extended liability beyond that defined by the Restate-
ment; it imposed a standard that balances several factors to deter-
mine liability.4 3 Overall, the courts continue to protect the auditor
and to apply the Ultramares standard, the Restatement position,
or some hybrid of the two."
In Rosenblum, the court intended finally to abandon the priv-
ity bar for negligence actions against auditors. It recognized vari-
ous public policy concerns and redefined the auditors' legal duty to
reflect changes in the modern business environment. This note
considers the court's perspective in order to determine whether its
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information ex-
tends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is
created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
The comments to the Restatement seem to mirror the concerns of the Ultramares opinion
and indicate that the reason for the more restrictive rule is that where only pecuniary loss is
involved, a rule of this nature promotes the operational efficiency of commercial transac-
tions. Id. at comment a. Compare this reasoning with that used by Judge Scheiber in the
Rosenblum opinion, infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (extended liability will not
unduly burden the accounting profession because of the availabity of liability insurance
coverage).
43. See Aluma Craft Manufacturing Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973). These factors are: "(1) The extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; and (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered." Id. at 383 (citing Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73
(Mo. 1967)). Even this limited extension of the rule of liability was unnecessary in light of
the allegations in the complaint that the auditors knew that the plaintiff would use and rely
upon the audit report-a situation that could be decided within the framework of the Re-
statement rule.
44. A third group of courts apparently adopt a position similar to Glanzer-the parties
bringing suit are specifically foreseen to rely on the audit. In order to equate this with the
modern trend, however, these courts cite the specific person language of the Restatement
Second to support their conclusion. See Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.D.
1974) (the court was not persuaded that the North Dakota Supreme Court would adopt a
negligence standard except where the audit was for the primary benefit of a third party and
the auditor had knowledge of the fact); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I.
1968); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455
F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) acq. Larsen v. United
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 300 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1981)); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox
& Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) explained in Tiffany Indus. v. Alexander Grant
& Co., 536 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Spherex v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898,
451 A.2d 1308 (1982); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971); Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). These cases, although
seemingly applying a primary benefit test, extend the principle beyond that addressed in
Glanzer or Ultramares and evidence the confusion prevalent in the court's discussion of the
issue of auditors' liability. For a more in-depth analysis of these opinions and a discussion of
the apparent inconsistencies in the current doctrine, see Gormley, supra note 14.
1984]
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approach to the issue was sound. The sections that follow will ana-
lyze the court's language, discuss the correctness and necessity of
its holding, and present a conclusion as to the future effect of the
opinion on auditors' liability.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
The Rosenblum court perceived the liability issue as twofold.
First, it considered whether, absent privity, a party can bring a
negligent misrepresentation action against the provider of a service
in order to recover for a purely economic loss. Second, the court
considered the type of legal duty that should be imposed on audi-
tors in order to best serve the public interest. The Rosenblum
court balanced the factors for and against recovery in light of the
auditor's role in the present financial environment.
45
The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that, absent a priv-
ity-like relationship, accountants generally are not held liable to
third party users of financial statements. Because this was a case
of first impression in New Jersey, the court had to decide whether
it would adopt this general rule.
The court first examined authority that allowed tort recovery
for the negligent representations of experts that resulted in both
physical injury and property damage."' Next, it looked at cases
that permitted recovery for economic losses resulting from misrep-
resentation in the performance of a service where the contractor
actually knew the beneficiary of his undertaking."7
Where the supplier of a service is not in a privity-like relation-
ship with the injured party the New Jersey case law is split as to
whether the injured party can sue the negligent supplier. The court
noted, however, that two recent decisions discard the privity re-
45. 93 N.J. at 333-34, 461 A.2d at 142.
46. Id. at 334, 461 A.2d at 143 (quoting Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J.
Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (App. Div. 1960)). It is interesting that the court cites Pabon for
the proposition that recovery for economic injury is allowed in suits for negligent misrepre-
sentation. The suit in Pabon was brought to recover damages for personal injuries and for
property damage to the plaintiff's automobile due to faults in the car's steering mechanism,
which defendant's employee assured plaintiff was normal. The action did not deal with the
type of injury that occurred in Rosenblum and was predicated on an express warranty on
the car.
47. The court cited Economy B. & L. Ass'n v. West Jersey Title Co., 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 A.
854 (Sup. Ct. 1899) as support for the proposition that recovery of economic loss due to
misrepresentation in the performance of a service is allowed when the contractor knows the
beneficiary. The action, however, unlike Rosenblum, was based not on negligence, but on
theories of contract and third party beneficiary status. But see infra text accompanying note
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quirement in negligent misrepresentation suits against the pro-
vider of a service.48
The first of the two cases, Immerman v. Ostertag,4e dealt with
the duty of notary publics to refrain from acts of negligence with
regard to third parties who rely on their acknowledgements. The
Rosenblum court apparently believed that the function of a notary
is analogous to that of an auditor. The court, however, ignored the
differences between the two services. Immerman involved a "pub-
lic officer," who knew what notarized documents were and knew
that the acknowledgment-taking service was for the primary bene-
fit of a particular person. Even if a notary does not know the iden-
tity of the person requesting the acknowledgment, at a minimum
he is aware that some person or entity will rely upon his acts. The
auditor also performs a service for the benefit of other parties, es-
pecially when the audit is performed in order to meet the require-
ments of lenders, shareholders, or regulatory agencies. What dis-
tinguishes the audit, however, is that the auditor does more than
acknowledge that the management's representations, in fact, are
made by the company; rather, the auditor certifies that the proce-
dures used by the management are correct and that the statements
are fairly presented in accordance with GAAP-a procedure much
more involved than the mere notarization of a document. The Im-
merman court further held that the notary's duty included only
ordinary and reasonable care to satisfy his "own conscience" as to
the truth of his representation.5" Thus, the Immerman standard of
care for a notary is much lower than that of an auditor under
Rosenblum."
The Rosenblum court also examined Gold Mills, Inc. v. Orbit
Processing Corp.52 In Gold Mills, a purchaser of goods brought suit
against a security service to recover for the value of goods stolen
from a transit company's premises. The security service had con-
48. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 335, 461 A.2d at 143.
49. 83 N.J. Super. 364, 199 A.2d 869 (Law Div. 1964).
50. Id. at 369-70, 199 A.2d at 872-73.
51. The Immerman case dealt with the notarization of documents signed by persons
who fraudulently represented themselves as those persons who were expected to sign the
documents. The court found that the notary's duty was no more than that of an ordinary
man under the circumstances. In Rosenblum, the lack of knowledge complained of also con-
cerned the accuracy of the certification of a fraudulent representation by another. Neverthe-
less, applying the Immerman principles to the auditors in Rosenblum would certainly not
support the Rosenblum court's broad imposition of liability upon the auditor. See infra note
76 and accompanying text for a discussion of accountants' professional standards concerning
the discovery of fraud.
52. 121 N.J. Super. 370, 297 A.2d 203 (Law Div. 1972).
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tracted with the shipper to guard the lots. The case did not deal
with negligent misrepresentations and, like Immerman, was a situ-
ation in which the service performed by the contractor benefited a
limited class of persons. Also, there were "[reasonably] foreseeable
consequences . . . if . . . [the defendant] failed to exercise due
care."" The effects of a negligent audit are not as readily
predictable.5
The Rosenblum court supported its opinion with New Jersey
authority on the issues of negligent misrepresentation and privity.
The court, however, failed to uncover any New Jersey case involv-
ing auditors' liability to third parties who relied on a negligent au-
dit to their economic detriment.5 The apparent lack of direct au-
thority forced the court to look to other jurisdictions for guidance.
It discovered that all of the other jurisdictions that had faced the
issue applied either Ultramares, Glanzer, or the Restatement.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that these decisions lacked per-
suasiveness. The court believed that, unless other policy considera-
tions existed, actions against negligent auditors were maintainable
irrespective of privity. Furthermore, the auditor's duty was defined
by the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his actions; the Ro-
senblum court set the outer limits of the duty as a matter of law."
The court's determination that the better method of defining
an auditor's duty is to examine the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of the party's actions does not retreat from precedent. All
courts that address the issue utilize a foreseeability test. The
courts differ, however, as to the results that they characterize as
legally foreseeable. The courts that stand on precedent perceive
the risk of harm to primary beneficiaries as the only foreseeable
consequence.5 ' Those that follow the Restatement" believe that
53. Id. at 377, 297 A.2d at 207.
54. For example, the claims against Touche that arose out of the Giant audit totaled
one hundred million dollars in eight lawsuits. Gormley, supra note 14, at 549 n.117. Gormley
suggests that the Rosenblum court's attempt to limit his duty to a limited group does not
take into account the ingenuity of counsel in obtaining sufficient documentation to prove
that a number of clients not covered by the Rosenblum rule-i.e. shareholders, bondholders,
institutional investors, and government agencies-fall within its protection. Id. at 555. The
extent of these possible claims may, in fact, be "indeterminate."
55. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 336-37, 461 A.2d at 144. The only case that the court found
was Coleco Industries v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (applying New Jersey
law).
56. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 338-39, 461 A.2d at 145.
57. The courts that have adopted the Ultramares rule have interpreted the decision to
mean that there is no duty of care to third parties in cases of negligent misrepresentation;
they completely bar the plaintiff's recovery. Up until the 1960's, courts even ignored the
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the "zone of danger" encompasses known recipients, or a known
class of recipients, exclusively. In either case, all of the courts ex-
press the fear of runaway liability and state that public policy con-
siderations demand that they fix the outer limits of the auditor's
duty within a narrowly proscribed framework.59
The Rosenblum court presented various arguments against the
decisions that favor limited liability for auditors. It indicated that
negligent misrepresentation actions are analogous to products lia-
bility actions, ° which are maintainable without privity." There-
fore, the court proposed that auditors' "[n]egligent misrepresenta-
tions .. .may be the basis of liability irrespective of privity.
'6 2
The court used two New Jersey products liability cases to support
its argument.
Martin v. Bengue, Inc."' dealt with the flammable vapors
emitted by a medicinal product, Ben-Gay. The court reasoned that
a manufacturer knows, or should know, about such latent dangers,
and must warn the public of the risks involved in the product's
use. The product's directions failed to warn against those risks or
even to mention them. Therefore, the court held that the user of
the product presented a valid claim against the manufacturer for
injuries suffered when the product caught fire, ignited his clothing,
and caused serious burns.
O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co." involved the
purchase of a "safety hook" that was used to support a man's
weight while trimming the upper part of a tree. When the hook
failed, the man fell, sustaining serious injuries. The manufacturer
gave the vendor explicit instructions regarding the hook's qualities
and recommended uses. Nevertheless, the vendor made representa-
tions about the hook that directly contradicted the manufacturer's
statements concerning the hook's composition and its suitability
for the purchaser's required use. The court held the vendor liable.
The Rosenblum court based its argument on the O'Donnell court's
third party-direct beneficiary test of Glanzer. See generally Besser, supra note 33 at 516-22;
Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGS L.J.
436, 447-50 (1964); Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third
Parties, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 113, 117-22 (1971).
58. See supra note 41.
59. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, comment a (1977) (reasons
for the limited liability).
60. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 339, 461 A.2d at 146.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 340, 461 A.2d at 146.
63. 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
64. 13 N.J. 319, 99 A.2d 577 (1953).
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conclusion that the defendant's representations were a factor in his
negligence."
The Rosenblum court's product analogy is tenuous, yet inter-
esting. When Rosenblum is analyzed in light of Martin and
O'Donnell, two differing conclusions emerge. Viewed against the
background of Martin, the audit report is a product, manufactured
by the accountant, that has a latent defect that the user cannot
discover. Alternatively, if the reasoning of O'Donnel is applied, the
underlying financial statements are the "product" and the audit
report is a representation concerning the adequacy and fitness of
the product for its intended use. The court, however, discussed
neither interpretation. It merely stated the proposition, leaving the
reader to determine upon which theory its holding relied. Closer
scrutiny of each alternative, however, gives insight into the court's
perception and reveals the weaknesses in its analysis.
The court's recital of O'Donnell implies that it believed that
the auditor guaranteed the statement's reliability. Nevertheless, an
audit report is not designed to fulfill a guaranteeing function. The
auditor attests to the fairness of the statement's presentation but
cannot guarantee that it is totally accurate or that the company
will remain in business. Unfortunately, financial statements are the
primary vehicle for obtaining the information necessary to business
decisions and the audit is a method of removing uncertainty from
the transaction. Because the audit report increases reliance on the
statements, it is usually perceived as guaranteeing the data.aa
If the Martin analogy is followed to its logical conclusion, the
audit report is inherently dangerous and needs special attention if
it is to be used safely. In order to avoid liability, therefore, the
auditor must warn of the risks. The only way to accomplish this is
through some type of disclaimer that reveals the scope of the audit
examination and the limitation inherent in the opinion. Such a dis-
claimer limits the reliance placed on the opinion and removes the
perception that the auditor guarantees the statement's accuracy. If
the auditor does not fully perform necessary audit procedures,
however, the product-the report-is not safe or suitable, and the
disclaimer ineffective. Moreover, as a practical matter, the ac-
65. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 340, 461 A.2d at 146. The actual language of the O'Donnell
opinion, relied on by the Rosenblum court, states that "such representations, although not
constituting a warranty, are a factor .... O'Donnell, 13 N.J. at 339, 99 A.2d at 588.
66. See generally infra note 89 (discussion of the meaning of an audit opinion, and of




counting profession may be reluctant to implement the disclaimer
approach. Nevertheless, the court seemed to perceive the dis-
claimer as an effective method for limiting the auditor's liability to
third parties. 7
After discussing both cases, the court incorporated the third
part of its syllogism; it queried why, if recovery for economic injury
may be awarded for defective products, such a loss should not be
compensable if caused by a negligent misrepresentation. The court
further stated that "[t]he maker of a product and the person mak-
ing a written representation with intent that it be relied upon are,
respectively, impliedly holding out that the product is reasonably
fit, suitable and safe and that the representation is reasonably
sufficient, suitable and accurate."" This language sounds like a
warranty theory, which arises out of contract and is implied in law.
The court, however, never discussed the warranty issue or the issue
of whether the plaintiffs were, or could be, third party beneficiaries
of the underlying contract. The court's next sentence was even
more confusing. It framed the issue as whether a party not in priv-
ity with the declarant, nor intended by the declarant to be a user
of the statement or opinion, should benefit from a duty of the de-
clarant to respond in damages for economic losses resulting from
such representations. The court spoke in terms of duty and fore-
seeability of use, but instead of treating the foreseeability of harm
to establish such a duty, it dealt with allusions to implied warran-
ties of fitness and with even more vague analogies to products lia-
bility concepts.
Apparently, the court was searching for a method to justify its
conclusion that, regardless of whether the statements are a prod-
uct, the opinion is a product, or both combined are a product, "[A
product-like] liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or a
release of the explosive power resident in words."' 9 Nevertheless,
there are inherent problems in this type of analysis because recent
opinions blur the distinction between actions in contract and ac-
tions in tort, especially in the products liability field. Furthermore,
courts often find it difficult to differentiate between a supplier of a
67. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. For further discussion on the unac-
ceptability of disclaimers, see Gormley, supra note 14, at 554; Recent Decisions, The En-
larging Scope of Auditors' Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59 NOTE DAME L. REv. 281,
289 n.56 (1983).
68. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147 (emphasis added).
69. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 181, 174 N.E. at 445.
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service and a supplier of a product.70 The Rosenblum court classi-
fied the audit as a product, thereby avoiding the analytical
problems that arise when an action is based on a negligently pro-
vided service.71
The court's proposal that negligent misrepresentation actions
are analogous to products liability actions is an attractive one, but
it does not dispose of the issue of auditors' liability. The Rosen-
blums complained of purely economic injuries, and many jurisdic-
tions do not allow products liability actions in the absence of phys-
ical harm. The court indicated, however, that the New Jersey case
of Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.72 allowed product liability
suits for economic damage.
In Santor, a purchaser brought suit against a carpet manufac-
turer, alleging that defects in the carpet made it virtually unusable.
The purchaser bought the carpet from a dealer, not the manufac-
turer. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the court of ap-
peals and reinstated the trial court's finding of liability, but it re-
manded on the issue of damages. It stated that the purchaser could
recover the difference between the price paid for the carpet and its
salvage value. Santor is a minority approach, but it is the leading
authority for the states that adopt its principle.73
70. See infra note 71. For a brief and interesting discussion on what the author believes
to be the inevitable remerger of contract actions and tort actions, see G. GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
71. Courts are very reluctant to impose strict tort liability on suppliers of services, as
opposed to products. The reason for this may be that in the case of services, the problem of
mass production and mass distribution are not present. The plaintiff generally has personal
contact with the defendant and knows, or can easily determine, who performed the service
and how it was done. See Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584
(1975). An audit opinion contains elements of both manufacturing and services. It involves a
production on a large scale due to the inclusion of the report in the financial statements, but
there is also readily available knowledge of who performed the audit and how it was per-
formed. Even when the service includes supplying a product, strict liability is often denied,
especially for "professional services." Although the suit against the accountant sounds in
negligence, these principles bear directly on the analogy made by the Rosenblum court. Be-
cause it did not even address the service aspect, the court may have been trying to avoid
precisely these problems. If the audit is a service and the report is a product, then the
performance of the audit is analogous to the manufacture of a product in a product liability
case. Unfortunately, these types of hypertechnical distinctions and fictions lead to the type
of clouded reasoning that has protected the auditor for so long. The true test should be one
of duty and foreseeability of harm, which the Rosenblum court does not address. Neverthe-
less, courts often find it necessary to "hang their hats" on these vague principles to support
their ultimate holdings. See Lehr, The Application of Products Liability Principles to Pro-
fessional Services, 48 INS. COUNSEL J. 434 (1981).
72. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
73. Most jurisdictions follow the approach of Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), which held that economic loss was not recoverable. For
[Vol. 38:939
ROSENBLUM v. ADLER
The Rosenblum court analyzed the auditor's role and held the
accountant liable to foreseeable users of the statements. 74 The
court pointed out that the company initially prepares the financial
statements-the auditor only examines them. 7 Therefore, reliabil-
ity of the statements depends upon the accuracy of the company's
underlying accounting data. The auditor bases his evaluation of
the statements on the accounting records and determines whether
they fairly reflect the company's operations. The court noted that
the auditor is neither required to investigate every document nor
expected to have the skills of a criminal investigatore.7  Neverthe-
less, the court determined that accountants who use due care and
professional methods may discover suspicious circumstances point-
ing to fraud. The court believed that the auditor who uncovers
wrongdoing in such a manner serves an undeniably beneficial pub-
lic purpose.
The Rosenblum court further discussed the expanding role of
the audit function and recognized that an accepted use of audited
statements is to provide them to third parties.7 7 The court found
that these "proper business purposes" include such uses as submis-
sion of the statements to banks and other lending institutions that
the cases that follow the rule of Santor, see the cases cited in Pennsylvania Glass Sand v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1171 n.17 (3d Cir. 1981).
74. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147. The court discussed a number of fac-
tors to be considered in determining whether a duty exists, including the burden that such a
duty would place on the defendant compared with the risk and burden to the plaintiff, the
availability and cost of either party insuring against the risk, and the effectiveness of placing
the burden on one rather than the other. Id. at 342, 461 A.2d at 147 (quoting 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS, § 18.6, at 1052 (1956)). Compare this with the standards used by
the court in Aluma Craft, supra note 43 (the Aluma Craft factors deal with issues of fore-
seeability of harm and causation; the Rosenblum court's test is more policy oriented).
75. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 343, 461 A.2d at 148 (citing Commission on Auditors' Re-
sponsibilities, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Report, Conclusions and
Recommendations 1 (1978)). See also AICPA, supra note 7, AU § 327. According to the
AICPA, before performing an audit, the accountant should procure a management represen-
tation letter that includes management's acknowledgement of its responsibility for the fair-.
ness of the financial statements, and the absence of errors and unrecorded transactions. See
id. AU § 333.04.
76. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 344, 461 A.2d at 148 (citing Commission on Auditors' Re-
sponsibilities, supra note 75, at 45). But cf. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(b) (Supp. V 1981) (amending § 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a response to Watergate, imposes certain accounting controls
concerning recording and safeguarding of assets, prohibits bribes by public and nonpublic
companies and mandates both civil and criminal penalties for violations of these provisions.
The Generally Accepted Auditing Standards of the AICPA instruct the accountant to pre-
pare internal accounting control reports and to present them to management in order to
satisfy the Act.
77. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 345, 461 A.2d at 149.
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might advance funds, and to suppliers of goods and services that
might advance credit.78 The court also questioned the argument
that the imposition of a duty on accountants to third party users
would bring financial catastrophe to the profession.7 9 Accountants
are already subject to extensive liability under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as to lia-
bility for fraud under Ultramares. Nevertheless, accountants have
procured insurance coverage against these risks.80 Therefore, the
court found no reason to believe that added liability would prove
unduly burdensome to the profession.8"
Rosenblum offered as a further justification the possibility
that the imposition of such a duty could be beneficial to the public.
A duty to third parties would force accountants to apply stricter
standards and closer supervision. The court believed that the busi-
ness entity could absorb the extra cost and pass it through to cli-
ents, stockholders, or customers.8 2
The Rosenblum court's perception that its holding would in-
crease accounting standards, and therefore benefit the public, dis-
plays a misunderstanding of the audit process. The court's argu-
ment is convincing, but it loses credibility when scrutinized against
the background of auditing principles. The court addressed the
role of the auditor, but it failed to discuss the role of the audit
itself as well as the factors that an auditor analyzes during the en-
gagement. The court ignored its previous assertions that auditors
already face substantial liability under the securities laws and
under common law fraud. Most audits are prepared for inclusion in
prospectuses, 10-K reports, and in the financial statements of com-
panies. Therefore, it is unlikely that the auditors would increase
their review procedures because of an additional risk of liability.
Even if the audit is performed solely for the benefit of lenders or
creditors, with no liability under the securities laws, liability to
these known users would still attach under the traditional rules of
78. Id. Under the federal securities laws these groups would only be protected if they
purchased securities registered with the SEC. For a discussion of federal law liability, see
Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 348-49, 461 A.2d at 151. See also Weiner, supra note 32, at 240 n.22
(discussion of liability under the Federal Securities Acts).
79. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 348, 461 A.2d at 151.
80. Id. at 349, 461 A.2d at 151.
81. Id. at 348-49 n.11, 461 A.2d at 151-52 n.11 (discussion of a number of insurance
plans presently available to accountants for liability imposed under the securities laws). One
commentator suggests that the court's "casual attitude" concerning accounts' liability insur-
ance is not supported by any factual basis regarding the actual availability of insurance
coverage. Gormley, supra note 14, at 571 & n.222.
82. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
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Glanzer and the Restatement.
The court also ignored the added time that is involved in ap-
plying more thorough review techniques. Presently, an average au-
dit takes anywhere from 4-6 months. This period is critical because
a primary element in the relevance of financial data is timeliness. 8
Without current data, the users of financial statements cannot ade-
quately evaluate a company's current position. Furthermore, the
longer the audit takes to complete, the longer the auditor is re-
sponsible for events that occur subsequent to the balance sheet
date.84 Due to their nature, subsequent events are not always capa-
ble of complete evaluation. Therefore, the increased time period
may create a greater risk of error than would exist without stricter
standards. Finally, the pervasive constraint on all auditing proce-
dures is that of the benefits of the procedure in relation to the
cost.8 5 The imposition of additional liability in order to assure that
greater care is exercised in the performance of the audit may raise
standards, but at increased costs. This approach ignores the eco-
nomic realities inherent in the audit process. If more extensive re-
views are too costly or impractical, many firms may forego them.
Furthermore, if the risk of liability is no greater than that already
present, or if the added procedures do not materially increase the
chance for error detection, then it is to no avail to insure against
increased liability. Therefore, the reasons for the rule may be of
little practical significance.
The court responded to the runaway liability argument with a
statement that under the announced rule there are "built in lim-
its" to the extent of financial exposure.8 In order to recover, the
plaintiff must establish that it received the audited statements for
a proper business purpose,8" that it relied on the statements, that
any misstatements were due to the auditor's negligence, and that
the negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage. 88
The defendant can avoid liability by refuting any of these ele-
ments. Nevertheless, the reliance requirement is the most difficult
to refute and may often be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. The
83. AICPA, Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (FAC) #2.
84. AICPA, supra note 7, AU § 560.
85. AICPA, supra note 83.
86. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
87. See supra text accompanying note 78.
88. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. Compare this general tort burden for
negligent misrepresentation with the plaintiff's burden under the securities laws. Id. at 349,
461 A.2d at 151 & n.10 (plaintiff must only show a material misrepresentation).
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overall public perception of the statement's purpose 9 lends itself
to a finding of reasonable reliance on the part of the user. When
combined with other factors such as the nature of the financial re-
ports, the importance of correct data, and the lack of competent
data outside the statements, these conclusions suggest that the
court's "limits" may be inconsequential.
The court also revealed a second limiting factor-that recov-
ery may be limited or barred under comparative or contributory
negligence laws. 0 The court did not address the form that this
negligence might take, however, and from a practical standpoint, it
is unlikely that the plaintiff's negligence will be a major factor in
this type of suit."
Rosenblum further proposed that the negligent accounting
firm could limit its financial exposure by seeking "indemnification
or contribution from the company and those blameworthy officers
or employees."92 This relief, although practical in theory, is of little
comfort where, as will often be the case when a suit of this nature
is brought, the audited company is bankrupt or judgment-proof.9 3
89. See discussion on this purpose, supra note 32. See also Rosenfield & Lorensen, Au-
ditors' Responsibilities and the Audit Report, J. ACCT., Sept. 1974, at 73-74 (the author
discusses the accounting profession's views on the auditor's role, as well as the differing
interpretations of the meaning of the unqualified auditor's opinion within the AICPA. The
interpretations suggested are that the unqualified opinion (see AICPA, supra note 7) con-
sists of two parts. First, that the presentation is in conformity with GAAP and second, that
one of the following is true: (a) conformity with GAAP results in fair presentation, (b) the
presentation is fair, or (c) GAAP have been fairly applied).
90. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350-51, 461 A.2d at 152.
91. In Ultramares, the plaintiff made several unsecured loans to Stern Company. This
may be negligence when one considers the problems often encountered with competing se-
curity interests, the need for perfection and priority, and the powers of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy. For an entertaining and informative discussion of the law of security interests and
priority, see R. LEVINE, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: AN OPERATIONAL TRANSLATION
(1980). The failure of Ultramares Corporation to adequately secure a number of its loans
may have been a factor in Cardozo's decision, because at the time there was no comparative
negligence and the plaintiffs' negligence acted as a complete bar to recovery. For a discus-
sion of the role that comparative negligence might play in a common law suit against the
auditor by the audited company for failure to detect errors and irregularities, see Menzel,
The Defense of Contributory Negligence in Accountant's Malpractice Actions, 13 SETON
HALL L. REV. 292 (1983).
92. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152. One commentator noted that the court
was unaware "that negotiation by an auditor of a contractual right of indemnification by or
on behalf of the client would disqualify the auditor from serving as independent auditor of
the client." Gormley, supra note 14, at 554 & n.139 (emphasis in original).
93. The court also pointed out that the auditor may limit reliance on the audit by dis-
claiming or limiting responsibility in certain circumstances. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461
A.2d at 152 (quoting Stanton & Dugdale, Recent Developments in Professional Negligence-
II: Accountant's Liability to Third Parties, 132 NEw L.J. 5 (1982)). However, the problem
with such an approach is that audited companies may not well receive a move of such mag-
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Finally, the Rosenblum court limited its holding to situations
where foreseeable users receive the audited statements from the
business entity. The company must issue the statements for a
proper business reason to influence a business decision of the
user.9 4 This includes lenders and suppliers, but not portfolio man-
agers, who do not receive the statements from the company. The
principle does not include shareholders who do not meet these nec-
essary conditions-the court stressed that it expressed no opinion
on these and similar situations."
The court next applied the newly promulgated rule to the
facts of the case. With regard to the 1971 audit, the court ex-
pressed its awareness that the traditional rationales of Ultramares
and of the Restatement did not apply. Because Touche completed
the audit in April and the merger negotiations began in Septem-
ber, the defendants prepared the audit report without knowledge
of the plaintiff's existence." Although the court considered the ar-
gument that the defendants authorized the plaintiff's use of the
statements and implicitly represented that they fairly presented
Giant's position, it concluded that liability was sustainable under
Glanzer97 or Economy B. & L. Association v. West Jersey Title
Co." Nevertheless, the court applied a broader principle in order
to avoid the confusion that the somewhat attenuated fact pattern
could cause at trial.9
The court concluded that it was "clearly foreseeable" at the
time that the audited statements were prepared, that the report
could be used for many proper business purposes."' These busi-
ness purposes included incorporation into Giant's annual report
given to its shareholders and the SEC, along with the proxy mater-
ials for the annual shareholders' meeting, public offerings of securi-
nitude because of the shadow that such a disclaimer may cast on the financial statements.
From a practical standpoint, the accounting profession as a whole would need to adopt dis-
claimers of this type, because any firm that acts unilaterally may risk losing business to
those who do not disclaim responsibility. See generally Rosenfield & Lorensen, supra note
89, at 82-83 (discussing the dangers inherent in allowing individual auditors to express per-
sonal opinions outside the framework of GAAP).
94. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
95. Id. at 352-53, 461 A.2d at 153. For a discussion of how far the opinion may be
extended, see infra text accompanying notes 109-15.
96. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 353, 461 A.2d at 154. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 7-11
(the facts imply a different conclusion).
97. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
98. 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 A. 854 (1899).
99. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 354, 461 A.2d at 154.
100. Id. at 355, 461 A.2d at 154.
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ties, credit, and corporate acquisitions.'"' The court further deter-
mined that the auditor's obligation for their representations
continued' 2 until the release of the next set of audited financial
statements: "[hiaving inserted the audit in that economic stream,
the defendants should be responsible for their careless misrepre-
sentations to parties who justifiably relied on their expert opin-
ions." 0 3 The court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff's position and assumed that the defendants negli-
gently prepared the 1971 audit. It found that Giant subsequently
delivered the statements to the plaintiffs in furtherance of their
business, i.e., merger negotiations (of which defendants had be-
come aware), and that the plaintiffs relied upon these statements
when they closed the merger transaction. Therefore, the court held
that the lower court erred in striking the cause of action that was
predicated on the 1971 audit.0 4
With regard to the 1972 audit, the court found that the plain-
tiff might have refused to consummate the deal had the statements
provided them with the proper data. The court believed that the
facts supported the proposition because the merger agreement rep-
resented that no materially adverse changes would occur in the
company's financial statements, and because Touche had prepared
the audit for the express purpose of the merger. Therefore, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the audit did not
cause the plaintiff's damage. The court affirmed the trial court's
denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims against the
1972 audit.
V. CONCLUSION
Litigation against accountants is increasing. 0 5 In this setting,
defrauded investors, lenders, and creditors will herald the Rosen-
blum rule as a major tool in the search for the "deep pocket" de-
101. Id. Presumably the Rosenblum fact pattern would fall within corporate acquisi-
tions.
102. Id. at 355, 461 A.2d at 154-55 (citing Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967)). This analysis, however, is incorrect. Although auditors are under a duty to disclose
after-acquired information, they have no duty to actively seek such information after the
date of the audit report. AICPA, supra note 7, AU § 561.
103. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 356, 461 A.2d at 155. This broad language sounds much like
language used in cases dealing with the Commerce Clause and with the power of Congress to
legislate in certain areas; it may indicate that the court extended the duty in an area that
Cardozo felt should be left to the legislature. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 187, 174 N.E. at 447.
104. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 356, 461 A.2d at 155.
105. See Weiner, supra note 32, at 234-35 n.3.
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fendant.'"I The decision professes to remove the privity bar of Ul-
tramares, which for over half a century has insulated the errant
accountant from liability for negligence to third parties. Unfortu-
nately, the court's extension of the auditors' duty occurred in a
case that did not require such overbreadth. The facts could sustain
liability under the traditional rules of Glanzer and of the Restate-
ment. Furthermore, because only a minority of the courts allow re-
covery for negligent misrepresentation when the injury is purely
economic,"0 7 the Rosenblum opinion may have limited application.
The court propounded a convincing analysis of the issue, but
ignored many problems that the situation presented. In its attempt
to address the concerns that caused courts to limit auditors' liabil-
ity, the court dealt only with the language of prior opinions and
not with the reality of the accounting profession. Nevertheless, the
court's instincts were correct. Its holding follows changes in the
modern legal environment. Other jurisdictions may not adopt the
Rosenblum court's reasoning, but they will certainly take notice of
the rule. Accountants provide a valuable service on which users of
financial statements greatly rely. It is easy to dismiss the argument
that imposing a duty on accountants to third parties creates an
extensive and costly burden for the profession and that it strangles
the flow of commercial information.1 08 The Rosenblum decision
protects lenders and suppliers, who are necessary to the efficient
operation of the commercial world. To impose on these parties,
who must rely on financial statement data for their business deci-
sions, the burden of absorbing losses due to false or misleading fi-
nancial statements, seriously undermines trust in financial infor-
mation. Conceivably, it could also lessen the availability of
essential commercial services." 9
The accounting profession is self-regulating. It makes every ef-
fort to keep procedures and practices at a level necessary for the
106. The accounting profession is a prime target in the search for a "deep pocket." "By
1981, gross revenues for the top eight firms had increased to well over $6 billion." Weiner,
supra note 32, at 236 n.10 (citing Wayne, The Year of the Accountant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3,
1982, § 3, at 1).
107. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, comment a (1977); supra notes 79-82
and accompanying text.
109. See generally supra note 32, for a discussion of the need of these parties to rely on
accountants for necessary financial information. As stated by "Frank C. Rozzono, a securi-
ties lawyer in the Washington, D.C., office of New York's Shea & Gould. 'If we cannot rely
on the public information put into the marketplace, then the financial institutions in this
country will collapse.'" Middleton, supra note 14, at 24.
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continuous and efficient performance of the accounting function."'
Unfortunately, accountants are often so engrossed in their crea-
tion, GAAP, that they are not cognizant of the vagaries of public
opinion reflected in the legislatures and in the courts."' The pro-
fession often responds only after a major case or a piece of legisla-
tion reveals the flaws in GAAP. 12 Whether the Rosenblum opinion
is such a case remains to be seen. The opinion is weak in places
and may not directly affect the profession in the immediate future.
Nevertheless, the rationale will most certainly be used as leverage
in the growing battle to tip the rules of liability in favor of placing
a greater duty upon the negligent auditor. If the Rosenblum court's
perceptions are valid, the opinion will cause a domino effect in
other jurisdictions. 1' a If its assumptions are incorrect, other courts
will ignore it. Because future plaintiffs' attorneys will definitely be
drawing on Rosenblum in an attempt to recover some, if not all, of
their clients' losses, the accounting profession and its counsel
should carefully consider the implications of the Rosenblum opin-
ion. If Rosenblum is, as this author believes, the first of a deluge of
auditors' negligence cases, accountants should attempt to re-
110. "The profession as a whole and authoritative bodies have the responsibility to es-
tablish the framework within which individual auditors should work. . . . If the profession
and authoritative bodies fail in that responsibility, everyone will suffer, including individual
auditors, the profession and the public." Rosenfield & Lorensen, supra note 89, at 82.
111. Although Cardozo left the decision as to whether or not to allow liability for ac-
countants without privity to the legislature, supra note 103, "no state legislature has done
so." Weiner, supra note 32, at 236 n.10. Nevertheless, "in the light of the economic matura-
tion of the independent accounting profession, . . . dependence on . . . judicial solitude
seems ill-advised." Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need for Increased Accounting
Uniformity, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 898, 921 (1965), quoted in Weiner, supra.
112. See, e.g., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19, In re McKesson & Robbins
(1940); In re Equity Funding Corp., 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See generally J.
CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION (1969) (discussion of federal law liability).
113. In a discussion concerning the U.S. Financial case, a suit in which twenty-three
plaintiffs successfully sued Touche Ross for negligent misrepresentation, Associate Justice
Weiner of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in California stated that similar scenarios
would play "to packed houses across the country." Weiner, supra note 32, at 234. His article
advocates extended liability for auditors. The article appeared five months prior to the Ro-
senblum opinion and outlined arguments adopted by the Rosenblum court. Furthermore,
less than a month subsequent to Rosenblum, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied sum-
mary judgment to a defendant-auditor on a negligence action and discarded section 552 as
too restrictive in light of Wisconsin's general rule that "a tortfeasor is fully liable for all
foreseeable consequence of his act except as those consequences are limited by policy fac-
tors." Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 383-84, 335 N.W. 2d at
361, 364-65 (1983). If the trend continues in this manner, Rosenblum may be a major deci-
sion in the future. For a discussion of Citizens State Bank, see Gormley, supra note 14, at
357-58; Recent Developments, supra note 67.
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spond' "' through the formulation of new auditing procedures,
through the reevaluation of the auditor's actual and perceived re-
sponsibility, and, perhaps, through future changes in legal strategy
when faced with this type of litigation."'
STEVEN E. STARK
114. One commentator stated, "In the absence of clear statements by the profession of
independent auditors' responsibilities and unambiquous reflection of those responsibilities
in the auditor's report, governmental bodies may impose responsibilities that are not con-
templated by auditors or that are not warranted." Rosenfield & Lorensen, supra note 89, at
78-79.
115. Although compliance with GAAP will not always protect the auditor, see Weiner,
supra note 32, at 239 n.19, good trial strategy might. For example, in a case in Dade County,
Florida, a jury found Touche Ross & Co. not liable for a failure to detect an embezzlement
by administrators of Cedars of Lebanon Hospital. Touche Ross's inside counsel stated that
"the jury's ability to grasp the technical issues in the case was impressive. 'Until recently
. . . the tendency. . . has been to shy away from a jury trial. But our case showed that a
jury isn't automatically the enemy of the CPA.'" J. AccT., May 1982, at 12. Rosenblum and
other opinions may have opened the door even wider for auditor's liability, but preventative
measures from the profession and well planned litigation by its counsel may be an effective
method to compensate for it.
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